NOTES
AIR LAW-WARSAW

CONVENTION-MENTAL

ANGUISH ALONE

IS A

17-Husserl v. Swiss Air
Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
COMPENSABLE INJURY UNDER ARTICLE

On September 6, 1970, a Swissair flight enroute from Zurich to
New York was hijacked to a desert outside Amman, Jordan, by members of an Arab terrorist organization.' After being held on the plane

for 24 hours, the passengers were later released and flown back to
New York 2 whereupon Greta Husserl, a passenger on the flight,
brought an action in federal district court against Swissair for damages
under the Warsaw Convention. 3 Although no claim was made that
the plaintiff "was injured by the impact of anv physical object on her
body," 4 it was asserted that the fear of injury or death brought about
by the hijacking caused various kinds of mental harm and related
physiological symptoms. 5
1 Hnsserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Swissair was not the only airline involved in the episode. Pan Am flight 93 and TWA flight
741 were also boarded on September 6, and taken to the Middle East. For an account of
the highly publicized hijacking incident see N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
2 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). After
spending one day on the hijacked plane, the women and children were taken to a hotel
in Amman. On September 11, they were transported to Nicosia, Cyprus, and on the 12th
to Zurich. The next day they were flown to New York. These facts were not disputed by
the parties. Id.
' Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, adhered to July 31, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]. For a comprehensive work on the Convention see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the WVarsaw Convention,
80 HARV. L. REv. 497 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfeld I].
The plaintiff also raised claims in tort and contract law. Husserl v. Swiss Air
Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). As the court's decision indicated,
these "alternative" claims were essential to the plaintiff's case. Id. at 1245, 1252. See
notes 82 and 86 infra and accompanying text.
4 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
5Id. For purposes of simplicity, the phrase "mental anguish" will be used throughout this Note to signify emotional harm, accompanied by psychosomatic or other manifestations, but not derived from any impact upon or physical injury to the body.
Dean Prosser has discussed in detail the various aspects of mental anguish. Mental
anguish alone is described as mental disturbance "without accompanying physical injury or physical consequences." W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 328 (4th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. This is distinguished from mental anguish vhich
is accompanied by some physical injury. Id. at 330. In the latter situation, the cases are
divided into those where the mental anguish is derived from a bodily injury (e.g., trauma resulting from a broken leg) as opposed to those .%,here the mental anguish itself
produces the physical harm (e.g., fright causing a miscarriage or heart attack). Id. & n.62.
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Since the plaintiff's injuries arose during an international flight, 6
the Warsaw Convention, which expressly governs air carrier liability
in international transportation, was applicable. 7 The Convention itself
is the product of an international conference on air law held in Warsaw, Poland in 1929, and it was proclaimed a treaty in the United
States by President Roosevelt in 1934.8 The primary purpose of the
With regard to mental anguish alone, there is generally no recovery. As Prosser
explains,
[t]he temporary emotion of fright, so far from serious that it does no physical
harm, is so evanescent a thing, so easily counterfeited, and usually so trivial,
that the courts have been quite unwilling to protect the plaintiff against mere
negligence, where the elements of extreme outrage and moral blame which
have had such weight in the case of the intentional tort are lacking.
Id. at 329 (footnotes omitted).
Recovery for mental anguish is more often permitted where some physical harm can
be shown. For example, where mental anguish flows from or immediately accompanies
a negligently inflicted bodily injury, the courts will ordinarily allow recovery for the
mental harm because "there is sufficient assurance that the mental injury is not
feigned." Id. at 330 (footnote omitted). Where the mental anguish initiates the physical harm, however, there is a split of authority. Many states will not permit relief when
the physical injury is caused by the mental anguish, unless there has also been demonstrated an "impact," however trivial, upon the body. Id. at 331. Although the necessity
for this requirement is slowly eroding, in many cases the plaintiff must still prove that
he has received some form of bodily impact. See id. at 332-33.
6 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1243 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
7 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, preamble, 49 Stat. at 3014, 137 L.N.T.S. at
15, which states that it regulates "in a uniform manner the conditions of international
transportation by air in respect . .. of the liabilitY of the carrier." See also id. art. 1, § 1,
49 Stat. at 3014, 137 L.N.T.S. at 15, which states that "[t]his convention shall apply to
all international transportation of persons . . . performed by aircraft for hire."
Lowenfeld I, supra note 3, at 498, 502. The Treats was written in French, and
adhered to by the United States in that language, even though an English translation
accompanied it. Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, 49 Stat. at 3000-13, 3014-26. Although the Senate advised adherence to the Treaty in its official French text, the hearing and vote were based on the English version. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388
F. Supp. 1238, 1249 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). An excellent background source on the presidential view in advising American adherence to the Convention in 1934 is SENATE COMM.
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NIESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING A CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES RELATING
TO INTER.NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION BY AIR, S. EXEC. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2-5 (1934) [hereinafter cited as MESSAGE FRIOM THE PRESIDENT].
Originally the Treaty set recovery limits at approximately $8,300 per passenger, and
in 1955 that amount was amended to $16,600 under The Hague Protocol. The United
States never ratified the Protocol, partly because of its dissatisfaction with the relatively
low $16,600 ceiling. On November 15, 1965, the United States Department of State
denounced the Warsaw Convention, effective six months thereafter. R. FIXEL, THE LAW
OF AVIATION § 616, at 699-706 (4th ed. 1967).
On May 14, 1966, the denunciation was withdrawn by reason of an interim agreement reached hetween a majority of the major international airlines and the United
States, as approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). Block v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 325 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967). The agreement raised the
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Convention was to establish a uniform system in the regulation of the
liability to which an international air carrier would be subject. 9 Article 17 of the Convention specifically states that an airline is liable
for "the death or wounding . . . or any other bodily injury"'1 suffered
by an air passenger in an accident on board an aircraft or while em-

barking or disembarking."
Since plaintiff Husserl alleged mental anguish without bodily

impact,1 2 the central issue before the trial court was whether such an
injury was claimable under the "death or wounding . . . or any other
bodily injury" phrase of Article 17.13 On motion for summary
judgment, 14 defendant Swissair argued that mental anguish was a
limit of recovery to $75,000 per passenger, and provided that the airlines would waive
their defenses under Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention, Lacey, Recent Developments in the Warsaw Convention, 33 J. AIR L. & Com. 385, 388-89 (1967), and assume
absolute liability for injuries resulting from an air accident. See Lowenfeld I, supra note
3, at 599-601. The modifications of the Convention brought about by this arrangement
have been called the "Montreal Agreement." Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F.
Supp. 1238, 1241 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). For details of the Agreement see Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and Hague Protocol, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). See generally Lowenfeld I, supra at 586-96.
The Husserl court in referring to the Warsaw Convention as well as the modifications effected by the Montreal Agreement used the phrase "Warsaw system." 388 F.
Supp. at 1241 n.2. Throughout this Note, "Warsaw Convention," "Convention," or
"Treaty" refers to the Montreal Agreement as well as the original Treat),.
9 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, preamble, 49 Stat. at 3014, 137 L.N.T.S. at 15. The
preamble states that the signatories, in adopting the treaty, had
recognized the advantage of regulating in a uniform manner the conditions of
international transportation by air in respect of ... the liability of the carrier.
Id. To effect uniformity, the Convention established a system of documentation with
regard to ticketing, air-waybills, baggage and freight, as well as a procedure for raising
claims by specifying the time limits and places for suits. Lowenfeld I, supra note 3, at
498-99.
'0 Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018, 137 L.N.T.S. at 23.
" Id.
The full text of Article 17 reads:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if
the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
12 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See
note 5 supra.
i3 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1242, 1246, 1248 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). For a general discussion of this issue see Lowenfeld, Hijacking, arsaw, and the
Problem of Psychic Trauma, I SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & Com. 345 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Lowenfeld II].
14 Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). This
was the defendant's second motion for summary judgment. See id. at 1241-42. In its first
motion, the defendant argued that under the Convention's liability provisions a hijacking was not an accident within the terms of Article 17. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co.,
351 F. Supp. 702, 704-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd per curiamn, 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir.
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claim implicitly precluded by the terms of Article 17, and that to
allow such a claim would not be in keeping with the Convention's
purpose of uniformity of regulation, its objective of limiting liability,
and the supremacy of the Treaty as the exclusive arbiter of an air
passenger's claim. 15 Plaintiff Husserl denied the defendant's contentions, urging that Article 17's terms should be interpreted to enconpass all areas of personal injury, including mental anguish. 6 Addi-

tionally, the plaintiff argued that she had a right to assert claims in
tort and contract alternative to any claim calling forth the presumptive liability established under the Convention. 17
In Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co. ,18 the court denied suLmary judgment for the defendant, holding that mental anguish was a
compensable injury under Article 17.19 In addition, the court con-

cluded that the Convention's conditions an( limitations applied to any
injuries alleged under Article 17, but that the cause of action for
20
those injuries must be derived from the local substantive law.
Therefore, since the court believed that the applicable local law
would be that of New York, and New York law provided a cause of
action for mental anguish alone, 2 1 it was held that the plaintiff as22
serted a valid claim before the court.
Prior to Husserl, two recent decisions in cases arising from a related hijacking incident had held that mental anguish alone was not a
claimable injury under the Warsaw Convention. In Burnett v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. ,23 two passengers claimed mental and bodily in1973). The court dismissed the motion, holding that a hijacking may be construed
to be an accident within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention. 351 F. Supp. at 707.
The text of Article 17 is reproduced in note 11 supra. For a discussion of the case see
39 J. AIR L. & Com. 445 (1973).
15 See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1242-43, 1246 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
16 Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
at 6, Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court (lid
not specifically refer to this side of plaintiff's argument, but rather incorporated it
throughout the decision. See 388 F. Supp. at 1242, 1249.
17Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Stipp. 1238, 1243 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). For a
discussion of the presumption of carrier liability tinder the Convention see note 8
supra.
"1 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
19 Id. at 1253.
20 Id.

21 Id. at 1252. For a discussion of the court's reasoning on these points see notes
85-86 infra and accompanying text.
22See 388 F. Supp. at 1252-53. It was stated that for purposes of the motion before
it, the court "puts aside its substantial doubt that plaintiff will be able to prove both
injury and causation.- Id. at 1242 (footnote omitted).
23 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973).
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juries after the jet in which they were traveling was hijacked to
Amman, Jordan. 24 During the six days the plaintiffs were held captive
on the aircraft, they suffered severe mental anguish by reason of the
activities of their hijackers, as well as bodily injuries due to the general conditions of confinement and the extreme variation of temperatures in the desert. 25 The issues considered by the Burnett court
were two: first, whether mental anguish alone was compensable
under Article 17, and second, whether mental anguish stemming
from a bodily injury was compensable under the Article. 26 It was held
that tinder the Convention the plaintiff could not recover for mental
anguish alone, but that compensation would be available for mental
anguish "directly resulting from a bodily injury" under the terms of
Article 17.27
The bulk of the analysis in the Burnett decision centered on the
issue of mental anguish alone. The court decided that by reason of
the French legal meaning of Article 17 a cause of action for mental
anguish alone was not allowable, 28 and further, that it could be inferred from the Convention's legislative history that it was the intent
29
of the drafters to restrict claimable injuries.
In the original French version of the Convention, the phrase "or
any other bodily injury" had been "ou de toute autre l6sion
corporelle.

"

3

0

By dictionary definition,

however, mental injury or

"wrong" translates as "lsion mentAle. '31 The Burnett court, upon examination of the possible variances of French-English interpretation,
determined that "h6sion corporelle" (bodily injury) and "h6sion
24 Id. at 1153. The plaintiffs in Burnett were victims of the same hijacking events of
September 6, 1970 as was the plaintiff in Husserl. However, while the Burnetts spent
six days on board their TWA jet, Greta Husserl was aboard the Swissair craft for only a
day. Compare id. with 388 F. Supp. at 1242.
25 368 F. Sopp. at 1153.
2Id. at 1155. For a general discussion of the distinctions concerning mental anguish see note 5 supra.
27 368 F. Supp. at 1158.
28 Id. at 1156. It was earlier determined that the French legal meaning of the
Convention's terms was controlling. Id. at 1155. Supporting this proposition was Block
v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), which held that because the Warsaw Convention was adhered to by the United States in the official
French version, "[tlhe binding meaning of the terms is the French legal meaning." Id.
at 330. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
29 368 F. Supp. at 1156-58.
3o Id.at 1156.
31 Id. See, e.g., DiCTIONNAIRE MODERNE FRANCAIs-ANGLAIS (6th ed. rev. 1960).
There, "corporelle" is translated simply as "bodily," id. at 165, and "mentale" as "mental," id. at 450. In fact, a "sp~cialiste de maladies mentales" is described as a "U.S.
pyschiatrist." Id.
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mentale" (mental injury) "appear to be mutually exclusive and therefore, sound construction compels the court to attribute to 'lsion cor32
porelle' its normal import only, excluding mental injury."
The legislative intent behind the Warsaw Convention also played
a key role in the Burnett court's interpretation of the Article 17
provision. 33 It was pointed out that the original version of air carrier
liability, as written by the First International Conference on Private
Air Law in 1925, proposed very broad and liberal liability
provisions. 34 That early draft read:
"Le transporteur est responsable des accidents, pertes,
avaries et retards."

"The carrier is liable for accidents, losses, damages to
goods and delays. 35

If this extensive liability provision had been adopted, the court noted,
then under French law mental anguish would have been comprehended. 3 6 However, the drafts proposed during the second convention in Warsaw in 1929 and the final form of Article 17 as it stands
now, exhibit a more restricted concept of liability than had been provided for in 1925, as is evidenced by the limitation of recoverable
injuries. 37
Accordingly, the Burnett court concluded that the restriction of
recovery to particular enumerated injuries reflected an effort on the
drafters' part to make the Convention more attractive to nations
whose laws did not provide for broad liability. 38 From its interpretation of the Convention's history, the court reasoned:
32 368 F. Supp. at 1156.

33Id.
34Id. at 1157.
3-Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting from de Vries translation:
FAIRES

ETRANGERES,

CONFERENCE

INTERNATIONALE

DE

MINISTERE

DROIT

PRIVE

DES

AF-

AERIEN,

FRANCE-DocuuENTs DIPLOMATIQUES, ser. C, pamph. 42, at 79 (1926)).

36368 F. Supp. at 1157. Citing Professor Henri Mazeaud, the Burnett court asserted
that an analysis of French law prior to 1925 would indicate that carrier liability would

extend to
cases where the carrier in failing to perform its contractual obligations infringed the emotional condition of the passenger: his sentiments of affection in
delaying his arrival at funeral ceremonies, the comfort to which he is entitled
by placing him in a baggage car, and even for the simple inconvenience of
delay in arrival.Id.

(footnote omitted) (quoting from H. MAZEAUD,

TitEORIQUE

ET

PRATIQUE

DE

LA

TRACTUELLE 416-17 (5th ed. 1957)).

RESPONSABILITE

L. MAZEAUD & A. TUNC, TRAITi
CIVILE

DELICTUELLE

ET

CON-

37368 F. Supp. at 1157. Compare the earlier draft emphasized by the Burnett court,
see text accompanying note 35 supra, with the present text of Article 17, reproduced in
note 11 supra.
38 368 F. Supp. at 1157.
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By thus restricting recovery to bodily injuries, the inference is
strong that the Convention intended to narrow the otherwise broad
scope of liability under the former draft and preclude recovery for
mental anguish alone. Had the delegates desired otherwise, there
would have been no reason to9 so substantially modify the proposed
3
draft of the First Conference.
With regard to mental anguish arising from a bodily injury, the Burnett court recognized that the Convention would generally allow recovery for the plaintiffs' "emotional distress" as if it were "a part of
the bodily injury itself."40
A very similar conclusion was reached in Rosman v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. ,al which dealt with the exact factual context, issues, and
claims present in Burnett. 42 In Rosman, the plaintiffs asked for damages under the Warsaw Convention for bodily injuries, mental anguish alone, and certain behavioral manifestations brought about by
the emotional distress. 43 In a six-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals of New York reinstated a verdict against the defendant for
the plaintiffs' bodily injuries and for damages arising therefrom, as

39

Id.

Id. at 1158. With regard to this second issue the court explained its position by
stating:
Certainly, mental anguish directly resulting from a bodily injury is damage sustained in the event of a bodily injury. The delegates apparently chose to follow
this well recognized principle of law allowing recovery for mental anguish resulting from the occurrence of a bodily injury . . . . Therefore, plaintiffs may
recover in this action for any such emotional anxiety that they can demonstrate
resulted from a bodily injury suffered as a consequence of the hijacking.
Id.
41 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974). Rosman was a consolidated action before the Court of Appeals of New York, which issued a decision concerning both Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 963, 338 N.Y.S.2d 664
(1972), and Herman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827
(1972).
42 The plaintiffs in Rosman were on the same TWA jet as the Burnett couple. Consequently, the facts and circumstances in Rosman and Burnett were the same, except
that the Rosman plaintiffs were Jewish, which, as the Rosman court noted, may have
increased their apprehension of bodily harm at the hands of their Arab captors. Compare 34 N.Y.2d at 388-89, 314 N.E.2d at 849-50, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 99-101 with 368 F.
Supp. at 1153. See also note 24 supra.
43 34 N.Y.2d at 388-89, 314 N.E.2d at 849-50, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 99-101. The behavioral manifestations alleged by the plaintiffs to have occurred after their release generally involved complaints of nervousness, tension and depression, as well as irritabilit), loss of sleep and nightmares. Id. These claims were distinguished by the court from
the "bodily" injuries claimed, which included backaches, swelling, boils, rashes and
skin discoloration. Id. The distinctions were important to the ultimate holding in the
case.
40
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well as those bodily injuries caused by the mental anguish. 44 However, the court refused to permit recovery for mental anguish alone,
or for the nonphysical symptoms of the mental anguish. 45 The Rosman decision, therefore, appeared to determine airline liability according to a division between bodily and mental injury, claims
arising from the former being permissible, but claims for the latter
46
alone held excluded.
Unlike the approach taken in Burnett, the Rosman court asserted
that an analysis of the legislative intent of the Convention's drafters
and the French legal meaning of its terms would not be determinative. 47 Instead, the court stated that an interpretation of Article 17 should seek to achieve uniformity of substance and application
tinder the Convention, and an understanding of its language in "its
48
ordinary and natural meaning."
The plain meaning of the critical words "bodily injury" in Article
17 was found to be "palpable, conspicuous physical injury."14 9 To the
court, this meaning denoted the opposite of "mental injury." 50 The
Rosman court believed that the aim of the Convention was to establish uniformity of law throughout its provisions, 5 ' and concluded that
a reading of the terms "wounding" or "bodily injury" which might

comprehend purely mental suffering without physical manifesta44Id. at 400, 404, 314 N.E.2d at 857, 859, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 110, 113.
45

Id. at 400, 314 N.E.2d at 857, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 110.

46 See id. at 399-400, 314 N.E.2d at 856-57, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 109-10.

Id. at 394-95, 314 N.E.2d at 853-54, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 104-05. The court stated that
[i]t does not follow from the fact that the treaty is written in French that in
interpreting it we are forever chained to French law, either as it existed when
the treaty was written or in its present state of development. There is no suggestion in the treaty that French law was intended to govern the meaning of
Warsaw's terms, nor have we found any indication to this effect in its legislative
history or from our study of its application and interpretation by other courts.
Id. at 394, 314 N.E.2d at 853, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 105. Furthermore, regarding the legislative intent behind the Convention, the court stated that it did not perceive
any useful purpose to be served by such a hearing to search out the intent of
the drafters of Warsaw. Our study of the minutes of the Convention indicates
that the drafters did not define or discuss what was meant by the phrase "death
or wounding .. .or any other bodily injury" in article 17.
Id. at 395, 314 N.E.2d at 854, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 105 (footnote omitted).
48 Id. at 396, 314 N.E.2d at 854-55, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
49 Id. at 397, 314 N.E.2d at 855, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 107 (footnote omitted).
50 Id. at 396, 314 N.E.2d at 855, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
s5See i. at 396, 314 N.E.2d at 854, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 106, wherein the court main47

tained:
The apparent purpose of the entire Convention is uniformity among its diverse adherent Nations-the achievement, so far as possible, of a uniform body
of law as to the various subject matters which are covered.
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tions . ..would little serve the interests of promoting uniformity in
the treaty's interpretation and application .... 52

Under the Rosinan holding, then, any damage claim brought
under Article 17 had to be based upon some physical injury caused

by an air accident. 5 3 The court stated that a physical injury which
resulted from the mental anguish engendered by the accident was
compensable and, further, that once this bodily harm existed, all
damages flowing therefrom, including "mental suffering," would also
be compensable. 5 4 However, the Rosman court asserted that under
the Warsaw Convention neither mental anguish alone nor mental anguish which produced a physical injury would be compensable, so
that an airline would not be liable "for the trauma as such or for the
'5 5
nonbodily or behavioral manifestations of that trauma. "
The Husserl decision substantially departed from Rosman,
primarily by expanding the interpretation of Article 17 to include
mental anguish, as well as every type of injury for which local law
provided a remedy.5 6 Whether the ordinary meaning of bodily injury
could be said to include mental injury was the critical question resolved by the Rosman court. That court emphasized the dissimilarity
between the terms "bodily injury" and "mental anguish." 57 The Husserl court, bv contrast, did not perceive that there were any distinctions to be drawn between these terms, and described argumentation on the point as "unconvincing and inconclusive. "58 Rather than
concentrating on definitional problems, the Husserl court considered
what effect allowing an action for an injury not enumerated within
Article 17 would have on the purposes and legislative intent behind
the Convention. In the court's view, the Convention was to be construed in light of the principle that it does not create its own cause of
action. 59 Thus, injured passengers may not "plead" the Convention as
such, but must instead seek their cause of action from the applicable
local law. 60 To the Husserl court, the Convention served only to afId. at 397, 314 N.E.2d at 855, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 107.
1d. at 399, 314 N.E.2d at 856, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
54 Id. at 399, 314 N.E.2d at 857, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
55Id. at 400, 314 N.E.2d at 857, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 109-10.
56 388 F. Supp. at 1247, 1250, 1253.
57 34 N.Y.2d at 397, 314 N.E.2d at 855, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 107. See text accompanying
notes 47-50 supra.
58 388 F. Supp. at 1250.
59Id. at 1243.
60 Id. at 1243, 1252. See also note 82 infra. For discussion of the conflicts of law
problems inherent in determining the applicable law see note 85 and sources cited note
93 infra.
52
53
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ford injured passengers a presumption of liability on the part of the
carrier, while at the same time limiting the amount of any recovery to
$75,000.61 The court further reasoned that the Convention's aim of
establishing uniformity in the regulation of international air carrier
liability was related to the intent of the drafters that such liability be
presumptive but limited.62
By creating Article 17, the court explained, the drafters must
have intended that the Convention's recovery limitations be exclusively applied to actions for injuries incurred during an air accident, if
those injuries were comprehended by the Article's terms. 63 A problem, however, would arise with regard to injuries "neither explicitly
nor implicitly comprehended by Article 17."64 The court was initially
faced with a hypothetical question: If an injury-for example, mental
anguish alone-were held to be outside the compass of Article 17,
how should a court deal with an action based on such an injury?
There were obviously two possible answers.
First, such an action could be disallowed as an intrusion upon
the uniformity of the Convention and an interference with its status
as the supreme and exclusive arbiter of claims for injuries arising in
international air travel. 65 A second alternative was that an action for
an injury not comprehended by Article 17 could be brought completely outside the Convention, as if that document did not exist,
assuming that the action would be one cognizable under the substantive law of the forum. 66 In spite of certain "reservations," the Husserl
court found the second alternative to be the legally correct one and
concluded "that such injuries [not provided for in Article 17] may
give rise to causes of action not subject to any of the conditions or
limits of the Warsaw systein." 67
61 388 F. Supp. at 1243. Regarding the maximum recovery amounts under the Convention, as well as the waiver of airline defenses, see note 8 supra.
62 388 F. Supp. at 1244.
63 Id. at 1244-45. Alter discussing the general purposes and objectives of the Con-

vention the court stated:
It seems implicit in these indisputable propositions that the purpose of the
Warsaw system and the intent of its drafters .. .must also have been to establish the exclusive relief available tbr damages resulting from an injury sustained
in international transportation.
Id. at 1244.
64 Id. at 1246.
65 This was essentially the position argued for by the defendants in Husser-1. See id.
at 1242, 1243.
66 If this were the case, then apparently the plaintiff would have to prove all the
elements of actions in tort or contract, without benefit of the carrier's absolute liability.

See id. at 1247.
67 Id. at 1246. This was consistent with the position taken in the earlier Ilusserl
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In light of this conclusion, the court undertook a reexamination
of the scope of Article 17, with emphasis upon the intent behind the
Convention's provisions. The Husserl court speculated that the
Convention's drafters might have believed that by the language of
Article 17 they had provided for all varieties of recoverable injuries. 68
Otherwise, it was reasoned, the drafters could have specifically listed
those injuries intended to be precluded, especially if a primary purpose of the Convention was the limitation of liability. 69 The court
appeared to lean toward the theory that the drafters intended to
cover all injuries but failed to do so clearly, concluding that "the
drafters neglected to deal with a problem which they would have
wished to resolve if they had been aware of it." 70 In the end, howdecision, see note 14 supra, wherein the court stated that
the Convention does not "exclusively regulate" the. relationship between passenger and carrier on an international flight, but rather sets limits on and renders uniform certain of the aspects of that relationship.
Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 351 F. Supp. 702, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.
2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1973). Instead, the court asserted, "if the Convention 'applies', it applies to limit-not eliminate-liability; if it does not apply, it leaves liability to be established according to traditional common law rules." 351 F. Supp. at 706.
But see Scarf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 4 Av. Cas. 17,795, 17,795 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) which held that "[t]he Convention relieved the carrier from liability under preexisting law and substituted a new liability with express limitations as to amount and
method of recovery."
68 388 F. Supp. at 1246. The court stated:
[I]t is quite possible that the drafters did not choose the appropriate words to
effect their intent. They may well have believed they had enumerated all types
of injuries for which any law provided a remedy. Such an inference from their
silence on some types of injury is at least as plausible as the inference defendant would draw. Indeed, the former inference may be reinforced by the
Convention's failure to explicitly preclude recovery for types of injury not con
prehended by Article 17 ....

Id.
The Husserl court's view that the Convention's drafters somehow did not put into
words the true expression of their intent regarding injuries appears to conflict with the
view taken in Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317 (1912), vherein the United States Supreme Court stated:
It is further to be observed that treaties are the subject of careful consideration before they are entered into, and are drawn by persons competent to express their meaning and to choose apt words in which to embody the purposes
of the high contracting parties.
Id. at 332.
69 388 F. Supp. at 1246. The court found it
extremely unlikely that the drafters considered other types of injuries but deliberately decided to leave the law unchanged as to them, allowing whatever
recoveries the law permitted. Furthermore, they must have been aware that to
extinguish pre-existing rights their intent and expression must lbe clear; ambiguity or silence is rarely, if ever, sufficient.

Id.
70 Id. (footnote omitted).
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ever, the court conceded that a "vacuum" existed with respect to the
legislative disposition toward those injuries outside the express terms
of the Convention's liability provisions. 71
It was observed that the argument could be made that the
Treaty's purpose of limiting liability would best be effectuated by
completely precluding relief for injuries not contemplated by Article
17.72 The Husserl court rejected the argument however, finding that
this purpose could be better achieved by interpreting "the types of
injuries enumerated [under Article 17] expansively to comprehend as
many types of injury as possible for which there is normally legal
redress. "73 It was also noted that a further purpose of the Convention
was to make it easier for an injured passenger to recover. 74 The court
conceded that it might be difficult in certain cases to ascertain the
appropriate substantive law of a particular locality, but no alternative
was apparent. 75
Having reached the foregoing conclusion, the court addressed
the arguments presented by the parties with respect to the language
of Article 17. The court observed that the various methods of ascribing meaning to the words, and the various canons of construction
invoked, could as easily support one position as the other. 76 For example, the defendant maintained that the words "death," "wounding," and "bodily injury" connote some visible physical impairment,
as opposed to mental anguish alone. 7 7 But the court indicated that
modern advances in the medical and behavioral sciences would sup-

71 Id.
72 Id. at 1246-47.
73 Id. at 1247 (footnote omitted).
74Id. To support its conclusion, the Huisserl court cited Lowenfeld & Nlendelsohn,
The United States and the "WarsawConvention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 499-500 (1967).
That article quoted then Secretary of' State Cordell Hull, who, when presenting the
Warsaw Convention to the Senate, described the potential benelits to air passengers as

follows:
It is believed that the principle limitation of liability will . .. lhe beneficial
to passengers and shippers as affording a more definite basis of recovery and as
tending to lessen litigation ....
Id. at 499 (quoting from NNIESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, supa note 8, at 3).
Although the Husserl court inferred from the foregoing that the facilitation of passenger recovery was a purpose of the Convention, it would appear from Secretary Hull's
letter that he was merely outlining the advantages the proposed Convention would offer
to passenger and freight transportation. For a critique of other passages of Secretary
Hull's letter see Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Conven tion, 26 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 323, 328-29 (1959).
75 388 F. Supp. at 1247.

76 Id. at 1248-49.
77See id. at 1242, 1250.
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port an interpretation of "bodily injuries" as "all personal injuries"

78
which pertain to general human dysfunctions.
In addition, the court stressed that since the drafters desired that
carrier liability be regulated uniformly, the Convention's provisions
must also have been meant to be comprehensive. 79 To carry out this
purpose, the court held that the types of injuries under Article 17
"should be construed expansively to encompass as many types of in80
jury as are colorably within the ambit of the enumerated types."
Mental anguish was found to be within that ambit, and therefore included under Article 17.81
As a corollary to its holding on mental anguish, the Husseri court
emphasized again that a cause of action could not be derived from the
Convention, a principle which the court viewed as "well-established,"
at least in the Second Circuit.82 Instead, it was stated, a plaintiff must
'8 Id. at 1250. The court elaborated on its view of bodily and mental injury, stating:
"Bodily injury" is perhaps particularly significant in this regard because of the
vast strides which have been taken relatively recently in the fields of physiology and psychology. It becomes increasingly evident that the mind is part of
the body.
Id.(emphasis added). However, after a discussion of the meaning of these terms, the
Husserl court determined that "[i]n the end all of these arguments and approaches are
unconvincing and inconclusive." Id. Cf. notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text.
79388 F. Supp. at 1250.
80 Id.

8iId. To the extent that the court referred to mental anguish as an enumerated
injury "colorably within the ambit" of Article 17, id., it appeared to qualify its previous
statement that Article 17 should be interpreted "to comprehend as many types of injury
as possible for which there is normally legal redress." Id. at 1247 (footnote omitted).
Compare text accompanying note 80 supra with text accompanying note 73 supra.
82 388 F. Supp. at 1252. The principle that in airline accident cases one's cause of
action arises from local law rather than from the Convention itself was consistent with
the court's perception that the Convention served only to prescribe a limit to passenger
recovery and to presume airline liability. Id. at 1243.
The "no cause of action" theory' was initially' propounded in Komlos v. Compagnie
Nationale Air France, 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 209 F.2d
436 (2d Cir. 1953), which held that the Warsaw Convention does not itself create a
cause of action. 111 F. Supp. at 401. Instead, it was indicated that the law of the place
where the accident occurred provided the cause of action under which a plaintiff must
claim. Id. at 403. The Komlos court did point out in dictum, however, that
if the law of the place of the accident does not provide for a right of action for
wrongful death, the forum would apply Article 17 of the Convention; and under
those circumstances it might be said that Article 17 created the right of action
for wrongful death. Under those circumstances, it may also be said that the
right of action, even though its gravaman is ex delicto, arises out of the contract of carriage which made the Rules and Regulations of the Warsaw Convention applicable to the internationaltransportation.
Id. at 402 (emphasis added). For a thorough discussion of the cause of action arising
from the contract of carriage under the Warsaw Convention see Calkins, The Cause of
Action Under the Warsaw Convention (pts. 1-2), 26 J. AiR L. & CoM. 217, 323 (1959).
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derive his cause of action from the applicable local substantive law. 83
The court noted, without elaboration, that the forum court would
have to determine the proper substantive law to be applied by following basic conflicts of law principles. 84 Thus, on the available facts, it
was determined that a New York court would probably apply New
York lav, 85 and since New York recognized a cause of action for menSee also Lowenfeld I, supra note 3, at 517; Lowenfeld II, supra note 13, at 350-52.
Five years later the "no cause of action" principle became more firmly established
in Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
907 (1957). There the court of appeals for the Second Circuit, in reaffirming the Komlos
view, stated "that the Convention (lid not create an independent right of action," and
that Article 17 only operated to presume liability. 247 F.2d at 679. However, contrary to
the Komnlos position, the Noel opinion determined that no cause of action arises from
the Treaty, even where none exists in the law of the place of the accident. Id. at 679-80.
The Noel court found that neither the terms of Article 17 nor the legislative history of
the Convention indicated that the Article would provide a remedy for an air passenger
injured in a place where the law provided no cause of action or where no law
existed-e.g., on the high seas. Id. at 680. See also Comment, Air Passenger Deaths
Resulting frooi Injuries Sustained on or Over the High Seas and at Unknown Places, 41
CORNELL L.Q. 243, 255-61 (1956).
Prior to the Koilos and Noel decisions, case law had considered the Convention
inherently to provide its own cause of action. Lowenfeld I, supra note 3, at 517-18. For
example, Salamon v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, NV., 107 N.Y.S.2d 768
(Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd mern., 281 App. Div. 965, 120 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1953), decided just
prior to Koinlos, specifically dealt with the subject. In Salamon, the court permitted
the plaintiff to assert only those causes of action which conformed to the Convention's
provisions, dismissing the alternative actions based upon New York law. 107 N.Y.S.2d
at 773-75. The court stated that the objective of the Convention to regulate uniformly
air carrier liability would be overturned
[i]f the carrier, in addition to the liability provided for in the Convention could
also be subjected to such other liabilities as might exist under the laws of such
state s might le selected for instituting suit ....
Id. at 773-74. Thus, the clear holding of Salarnon was that Article 17 not only purported
to create its own cause of action, but also was paramount to state law and would be
controlling in the event of any inconsistency. Id. at 772-73. See also Seth v. British
Overseas Airways Corp., 329 F.2d 302, 305 (1st Cir. 1964) (Article 18, concerning lost or
damaged baggage, creates its own right of action).
The Husserl court elected to follow the Konilos and Noel opinions, indicating that
causes of action under New York law should be adopted by the claimant for injuries
comprehended by Article 17. 388 F. Supp. at 1252-53.
83 388 F. Supp. at 1252.
84 Id.
85 Id. The court cited Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). Babcock had held that the " 'center of gravity' " or " 'grouping of
contacts' " principles, previously employed in conflicts of law situations involving contracts, should be similarly applied in tort cases. Id. at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240
N.Y.S.2d at 749. The court stated that the most equitable and practical result could
best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction
which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties,
has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.
Id. The Husserl court apparently believed that under the foregoing principles, a New
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tal anguish alone,8 6 the Husserl court allowed the plaintiff her day in
court on the mental anguish issue, "subject to the conditions and
87
limits" of the Convention.
In light of Rosman and Burnett, the Husserl decision is unique in
that it interpreted Article 17 so expansively, including under the
Convention claims for mental anguish, as well as claims for any other
injuries cognizable under local law. Should the decision be upheld on
appeal,8 8 there will remain a number of questions and problems to be
resolved.
First, it is unlikely that any local law, at least in the United
States, would fail to provide a cause of action for death, wounding, or
bodily injury. However, actions for mental anguish raise a problem
because they are not uniformly recognized in all jurisdictions.8 9
While the substantive law of New York, for example, allows recovery
for mental anguish alone, 90 the majority of states require a corroborative physical injury in order to prove emotional harm, and would thus
not supply a cause of action to a passenger claiming only mental
anguish. 9 1 An application of the Husserl decision, therefore, would
York court would find that New York had the greatest interest in having its law applied
to the issue before it. See 388 F. Supp. at 1252. For an extensive discussion of the
Babcock decision and its effect on conflicts of law see Cavers, Cheatham, Currie,
Ehrenzweig, Leflar & Reese, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development
in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212 (1963).
86 388 F. Supp. at 1252. The court cited Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d
729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961), where the plaintiff, an infant, became extremely frightened
and hysterical upon descending a ski lift, because a state employee had negligently
failed to fasten the retaining belt properly. Id. at 238-39, 176 N.E.2d at 729, 219
N.Y.S.2d at 35. It was held that a claim for mental anguish without physical impact
presented a valid cause of action upon which recovery could be sought. Id. at 239, 242,
176 N.E.2d at 730, 732, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 35, 38. This overruled the prevailing New York
authority governing mental anguish, Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E.
354 (1896).
Dean Prosser, although supporting the Battalla holding, found that a considerable
number of states still adhere to the stricter rule that in order to preclude the possibility
of fictitious claims, a cause of action for mental anguish must exhibit a "guarantee of
genuineness" by evidence of a physical impact. PROSSER, supra note 5. § 54, at 328,
331-32. He nevertheless observed that
cases will . . .be rare in which "mental anguish," not so severe as to cause
physical harm, will be so clearly a serious wrong worth,, of redress, or sufficiently attested by the circumstances of the case.
Id. at 330 (footnote omitted). See also note 5 supra.
87 388 F. Supp. at 1252.
8 An appeal from the decision has already been filed. Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp.
Co., Civ. No. 75-7298 (2d Cir., filed May 14, 1975).
89See generally PROSSER, supra note 5, § 54, at 330-33.
90 See note 86 supra.
9i PROSSER,

supra note 5, § 54, at 328-29.
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provide relief for a plaintiff only in those situations where the applicable local law itself so provides. This result would seem incongruous,
however, inasmuch as the Warsaw Convention was clearly intended
not only to regulate carrier liability, but also to regulate in a uniform
manner. 92

A further problem associated with air accident cases involving
mental anguish concerns the conflicts of law principles to be
followed. 9 3 State courts, and federal courts sitting within the states
and applying state law, utilize varying conflicts theories in order to
determine which substantive law to apply, where more than one
jurisdiction is involved in the action. 9 4 Since a passenger's mental
anguish claim would be determined according to local law, and not
every local law recognizes a cause of action for mental anguish alone,
resolution of the conflicts problem could effectively determine the
outcome of a particular case. 95
For example, if a plaintiff brought a Husserl-type action in a
forum which recognized a cause of action for mental anguish alone,
but the court determined that the applicable substantive law was that
of a jurisdiction which failed to supply such a cause of action, the
plaintiff would apparently be precluded from any recovery. Conversely, if a plaintiff sued in a forum which did not provide for mental
anguish claims, but the court decided to apply the law of a jurisdiction that did, such plaintiff would be permitted to pursue his action,
the law of the forum notwithstanding. While such results are actually
a consequence of the local cause of action principle 96 rather than the
Husserl court's interpretation of the Warsaw Treaty and its purposes,
the possibility of almost random recoveries based on wholly fortuitous
£wto-tr ic annarent.

97

92 See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
93 See Lowenfeld I, supra note 3, at 526-32, 578-86. See also Gair, Aviation Law
Today, 30 ALBANY L. REV. 189, 194-204 (1966); Note, A Proposal to Make Lex
Doinicilii the Required Choice of Law Under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, 9
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1118, 1129-38 (1968).
94 See generally Cheatham and Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 959 (1952).

95 Cf. Lowenfeld 1I, supra note 13, at 349.
9 See notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
97 The possibilities inherent in any accident case have been well illustrated:
The ice began to form on the wings over Pennsylvania; the wrong handle was
pulled in the air over Maryland so that the de-icer broke down over West Virginia and the plane fell in Virginia.
Knauth, Renvoi and Other Conflicts Problems in Transportation Law, 49 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 19 (1949). While a trend toward courts' use of the law of the place with most

significant contacts, rather than the law of the place of the accident (lex loci delecti), has
eliminated some of the "randomness" inherent in air accident cases, see Note, supra
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As suggested by the foregoing analysis, there is a distinct opportunity for forum shopping by an air passenger seeking recovery for
mental anguish without bodily injury. These plaintiffs would have to
engage in a two-step process in that they would first have to determine which state's substantive law allowed recovery for mental
anguish, and then determine which state's conflicts of law rule would
result in the application of the favorable substantive law. 9 8 There is
obviously much uncertainty in such a process, but the opportunity
for forum shopping is enhanced greatly by the Convention itself,
which provides for a number of jurisdictions in which an injured
passenger may sue. 99 Forum shopping aside, the conflicts problems
with which courts will be presented may further complicate this type
of litigation. 100
Whatever difficulties Husserl created, its expansive interpretation
of Article 17 of the Convention at least placed actions for mental anguish, where recognized, into an established legal framework for
recovery. 101 If Husserl is reversed on appeal and mental anguish is
held not compensable under the terms of Article 17 of the Convention, the Second Circuit will still be faced with the question of what
to do with the cause of action. Should an action for mental anguish
be permitted completely outside the Convention, as Husserl suggested? 10 2 This would benefit plaintiffs in certain cases, but might
conflict with a treaty intended to comprehensively regulate air carrier
liability.' 0 3 Should an action for mental anguish alone be precluded
completely, as in Rosman, so that no plaintiff could recover? 10 4 This
note 93, at 1129-34, Husserl injects a new variable in that only a limited number of
states recognize a cause of action for mental anguish alone. See PROSSER, supra note

5, § 54, at 328-29, 332. See also note 5 supra.
98 The Husserl court itself performed this two-step process in deciding that New
York's conflicts principles would result in an application of New York substantive law,
and that under New York law mental anguish alone was a recognized cause of action.
388 F. Supp. at 1252.
99 Article 28 of the Convention provides that
[a]n action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of
the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has
a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the
court at the place of destination.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 28, § 1, 49 Stat. at 3020, 137 L.N.T.S. at 27-29.
For an analysis of Article 28 see Lowenfeld I, supra note 3, at 522-26.
100 See Lowenfeld I, supra note 3, at 583-86.
101 See 388 F. Supp. at 1252-53.
102 See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
103 See 34 N.Y.2d at 398-99, 314 N.E.2d at 856, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 108. See also
Lowenfeld I, supra note 3, at 499-500; note 6 supra and accompanying text.
104 See 34 N.Y.2d at 400, 314 N.E.2d at 857, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 109-10.
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alternative would have the virtues of simplicity and uniformity of application as the Convention dictates, but it would deprive plaintiffs of
a cause of action ordinarily maintainable under the otherwise applicable substantive law. 10 5 Whichever way the issue is ultimately
resolved, the outcome may have far-reaching ramifications with
respect to the differing legal interests and rights of air passengers
and carriers alike.
Gregory T. Smith
105See 388 F. Supp. at 1251. The Husserl court disagreed with the Rosman and
Burnett decisions, which had disallowed claims for mental anguish, stating its belief
that
mental injury alone should be compensable, if the otherwise applicable substantive law provides an appropriate cause of action. To hold otherwise . . .
would not only create confusing problems of proof but also limit the effectiveness of the Warsaw system in achieving its purpose.
Id.

